In many common law jurisdictions, some or all instances of invasion of privacy constitute a privacy-specific wrong either at common law (including equity) 
I INTRODUCTION
A person's interest in privacy can be disrespected in different ways, for example by unauthorised intrusion into the physical private sphere of that person, by unauthorised public disclosure of details of the person's private life, or by unauthorised use of the person's image or name. All these instances shall be called invasions of privacy. An invasion of privacy may fall into the scope of a civil wrong that is not specifically designed to address invasions of privacy, such as breach of contract, breach of confidence (in its traditional meaning), breach of fiduciary duty, copyright infringement, defamation or trespass to land. Moreover, in many common law jurisdictions, some or all instances of invasion of privacy are covered by a privacy-specific civil wrong either at common law (including equity) or under statute. A remedy invariably available for such a wrong is compensation for loss, financial and otherwise.
It may happen that the profit that the defendant has made from invading the plaintiff's privacy exceeds the plaintiff's loss, even including non-pecuniary loss. A prime example is increased sales of a newspaper issue due to a front-page story about a celebrity's private life. This article examines when a plaintiff is and should be entitled to claim the defendant's profit, provided that invasion of privacy is actionable as such. Whether it ought to be actionable will not be considered.
1 After a brief overview of the relevant law in major common law jurisdictions, this article will discuss whether gain-based relief should in principle be available for invasion of privacy. Instead of considering invasion of privacy in isolation from other wrongs, it will investigate how invasion of privacy fits into a general concept of what is called 'restitution for wrongs'. It will be argued that the right to privacy is a right against the whole world and as such forms a proper basis of awarding gain-based relief for the unauthorised use of that right. The precise calculation of the gain to be given up will not be discussed.
II OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LAW IN MAJOR COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS A Australia
Traditionally, no common law tort of invasion of privacy existed in Australia. 2 In 2001, several judges in the High Court of Australia observed that there is no barrier to the creation of such a tort, 3 but none of the judges went so far as to find that the tort exists. Australian common law remains unsettled in this respect and it seems that the Australian courts prefer a privacy-specific wrong to be created through legislation rather than at common law.
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Limited protection of privacy is already achieved by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), which regulates the collection, storage and use of personal information by large private organisations unless it is in the course of journalism 9 (and by government agencies).
Complaints can be made to the Australian Information Commissioner, and the Federal Court can enforce the Commissioner's non-binding determinations, 11 which may include an order of compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, 12 but not gain-based relief.
Three law reform bodies in Australia recently recommended the creation of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy. In 2008, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended the enactment of federal legislation that creates a cause of action for a serious invasion of privacy and provides for various remedies including damages, an account of profits and an injunction, but not exemplary damages. 13 in its traditional meaning may be assessed by reference to the cost that the defendant would have incurred in either obtaining a licence from the plaintiff or developing the knowledge (in particular commercial know-how) independently. 43 However, whenever gain-based relief was awarded for breach of confidence in its traditional meaning, the breach concerned trade secrets or other commercially valuable information but not purely private information.
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In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), the Court of Appeal effectively recognised the availability of gain-based relief for breach of privacy, even though the court denied gainbased relief in casu. The magazine Hello! published photos surreptitiously taken at the wedding of actors Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, who had sold the exclusive right to publish photos of their wedding to the magazine OK! and had taken elaborate measures to prevent the unauthorised taking of photos at their wedding. In the Douglases' claim against Hello! for breach of privacy, the Court of Appeal made clear that it 'would have had no hesitation' to award an account of profits had Hello! made a profit from the publication. 45 The court did reject an award of damages calculated by reference to a hypothetical licence fee, on the ground that the Douglases would never have permitted Hello! to publish the unauthorised photographs and had indeed been prevented from giving such permission by the exclusive licence granted to OK!, which also made it difficult to assess the hypothetical licence fee. who agreed with Gault P in a separate judgment, described the new tort in this way:
'It is actionable as a tort to publish information or material in respect of which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy, unless that information or material constitutes a matter of legitimate public concern justifying publication in the public interest.'
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The new tort has since been applied in a first-instance decision (where the requirements of liability were held to have not been established), 54 If the plaintiff proves that the invasion of privacy was committed for a commercial purpose, the defendant shall also be subject to disgorgement to the plaintiff of any proceeds or other consideration obtained as a result of the violation of this section.
III A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
Should gain-based relief be available for invasion of privacy where invasion of privacy is actionable as such? Answers to that question can be developed in two different ways. One way is to look at invasion of privacy in isolation from other wrongs and to invoke policy considerations specifically relating to privacy. Under this approach, it could be argued, for example, that gain-based relief is needed as a deterrent against invasions of privacy since the loss caused by such invasions is often non-pecuniary and compensation for nonpecuniary loss cannot adequately restore the plaintiff to the status quo ante. The other way of arguing for or against gain-based relief in cases of invasion of privacy is to develop criteria for when 'restitution for wrongs' should generally be available or unavailable, and to apply those criteria to the specific case of invasion of privacy. This article adopts that approach. Some commentators support the availability of gain-based relief for all wrongs 64 or at least all torts. 65 But most commentators present more differentiated theories on when 'restitution for wrongs' ought to be available. This part starts by outlining the theories of major participants in the debate, and examines the consequences of each theory for invasion of privacy. Wrongs that happen to cover certain forms of invasion of privacy but are not privacy-specific, such as breach of contract or trespass to land, are not considered in detail. Subsequently, this part develops an argument in favour of gain-based relief in cases of (culpable) invasion of privacy, based on a general concept of unjust enrichment through unauthorised use of another person's exclusive entitlement.
A Birks
In the view of Birks, 'restitution for wrongs' ought to be available in three (overlapping) categories: where the defendant has deliberately set out to enrich himself by committing the wrong; where the duty broken aims to prevent the enrichment in question; and where the availability of restitution is a prophylactic measure to prevent certain enrichment or harm.
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The third category (prophylaxis) is irrelevant in the present context since it comprises only certain types of breach of fiduciary duty. The first category is relevant because it encompasses invasion of privacy if the defendant 'has deliberately set out to enrich himself by committing' the invasion. 67 This category is potentially wide since it could encompass every wrongful publication of private information in a commercial newspaper by virtue of the newspaper being sold for profit. However, the category is more likely to be confined to the situation where the newspaper's publisher intended to make extra profit through the story in question. It is probably also required that the defendant knew of the wrongfulness of the conduct in question or knew at least the facts constituting the wrong. 
B Edelman
Edelman distinguishes two types of gain-based damages for civil wrongs, which he calls 'restitutionary damages' and 'disgorgement damages'. 76 Restitutionary damages reverse a wrongful transfer of value from the plaintiff to the defendant. They are based on Aristotelian corrective justice and ought to be available for every civil wrong. In the case of unauthorised use of a secret drink recipe, restitutionary damages can be measured by reference to the cost of a consultant to develop the drink without using the secret recipe.
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Such an award reverses the transfer from the plaintiff to the defendant of the market value of the protected information. Disgorgement damages do not require a transfer of value from the plaintiff to the defendant. They strip the defendant of profits made as a result of the wrong, irrespective of the source of the profit. They aim to provide deterrence where a compensatory award fails to do so sufficiently. This is the case for breach of fiduciary duty and for wrongs committed with a view to make profit exceeding the victim's loss. An example is the deliberate exploitation of confidential information for financial gain.
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Edelman says nothing expressly on invasion of privacy. It seems clear though that an award of the full profit made by an invader of privacy is an award of disgorgement damages in Edelman's taxonomy and thus only available where the private information was deliberately exploited for financial gain. In the case of the unauthorised publication of private information in a newspaper, this probably requires an intention to make extra profit through that particular story. It probably also requires awareness of the wrongfulness of the publication since Edelman expressly refers to Seager v Copydex Ltd (No 1) , 79 which involved the unauthorised use of a secret idea for a design, and saw Lord Denning MR's remark that it 'may not be a case for … an account' 80 as being based on the fact that the use of the idea was inadvertent.
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Restitutionary damages in Edelman's taxonomy are available for every wrong and thus for every invasion of privacy that constitutes a wrong. Their measure is the market value of the protected information. Where the plaintiff would have been willing to sell the information and the defendant would have been willing to pay for it, the market value of 76 James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart, 2002) the information can be determined by reference to the price on which the parties would have agreed. But it is difficult to ascertain a market value where there was no market for the information at issue, in particular where the plaintiff would never have consented to a disclosure of the information. Under Edelman's theory, therefore, every invasion of privacy that constitutes a wrong attracts gain-based recovery but the measure of recovery is not always clear.
C Friedmann
Friedmann 82 recognises two categories of gain-based relief in the context of wrongs. One is the commission of a wrong in circumstances where considerations of deterrence and punishment call for gain-based relief. A prime example of such a wrong is breach of fiduciary duty. Invasions of privacy do not seem to fall into this category. The other, and more common, category of gain-based relief in the context of wrongs is the 'appropriation' of a property or quasi-property interest. 'Property' for this purpose comprises not only tangible and intangible property in its actual sense but also other exclusive rights such as the rights to reputation and to bodily integrity. Any 'appropriation' of such 'property' triggers gain-based relief, whether or not the appropriation amounts to a tort. Quasiproperty rights are protected interests in ideas, information, trade secrets and opportunity. Since they lack the element of exclusiveness, gain-based relief is not triggered by every appropriation. Additional factors are required, such as the wrongfulness of the appropriation.
In the context of privacy, Friedmann clearly classifies as a form of 'property' the exclusive right to authorise commercial use of one's name or likeness ('right of publicity'). 83 He therefore favours the availability of gain-based relief for such invasions of privacy as the one occurring in Douglas v Hello! Ltd. 84 Friedmann's view is unclear with regard to other privacy interests. In a recent article, he pointed out that the right of privacy comprises diverse interests, and emphasised the need to determine the availability of gainbased relief individually for each interest. 85 In that context, he observed that the 'right of publicity' is assignable whereas the right to prevent public disclosure of private facts is probably not. It is unclear whether he meant to make the availability of gain-based relief for invasion of privacy dependent upon the alienability of the violated interest. In the original exposition of his theory on gain-based relief in the context of wrongs, Friedmann had expressly rejected alienability as a prerequisite of gain-based relief, arguing that the wrongful appropriation of an inalienable interest in effect makes it a marketable interest.
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One situation he mentioned in that context is the public disclosure of private facts. Friedmann may thus favour the availability of gain-based relief for all invasions of privacy.
D Jackman
In Jackman's view, an award of gain-based damages for proprietary torts, breach of a restrictive covenant, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence (in its traditional meaning) protects the 'facilitative institutions' of property and relationships of trust and confidence. 87 Gain-based damages redress harm to the facilitative institution where this cannot be done by compensatory damages because the individual victim has suffered no loss. With regard to breach of contract other than breach of a restrictive covenant, Jackman argues that compensatory damages are normally sufficient to protect the institution of contract but that additional protection in the form of an account of profits might be required where a contract is deliberately broken for the sake of making a gain. Privacy is not mentioned by Jackman and thus apparently not regarded as a 'facilitative institution' in need of protection through gain-based damages.
E Jaffey
Like Edelman, Jaffey makes a sharp distinction between hypothetical-fee awards, which Jaffey calls the 'use claim', and disgorgement of profits. 88 Unlike Edelman, however, Jaffey is not of the view that the use claim always reverses a transfer of value. Jaffey differs from Edelman further in respect of the scope of the two forms of gain-based relief. For Jaffey, the use claim arises not from a wrong but from an imputed contract that effects an exchange of payment for a benefit. A contract is imputed where the defendant infringed the claimant's exclusive right to exploit an asset. Instances of this are the use of tangible and intellectual property, breach of a restrictive covenant and forced labour, but not defamation, trespass to the person, deceit or (ordinary) breach of contract. Invasions of privacy also seem to fall outside the scope of the use claim. But they fall into the scope of disgorgement of profits which, according to Jaffey, 89 ought to be available for all wrongs (which in Jaffey's taxonomy excludes most breaches of contract) even though it constitutes a form of civil punishment for wrongs.
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Ibid 511-12. 
F Tettenborn
Tettenborn favours the availability of gain-based relief for two types of wrongs. 90 One is the breach of an obligation of loyalty, which is irrelevant in the present context. The other is the infringement of a property right or another right that exists at least partly for the purpose of being traded or turned into money. Gain-based relief is appropriate in this situation as the defendant should not be able to escape the bargaining process. An example of a right that does not exist to be bought or sold is the right not to be assaulted or injured. Gain-based relief is therefore inappropriate where a third party paid the defendant to beat up the plaintiff. In the context of privacy, Tettenborn's theory leads to a distinction between rights that are 'tradeable' and rights that are not. The right to the exclusive use of one's name or likeness is tradeable and thus attracts gain-based relief under Tettenborn's theory. But the right to prevent intrusion into the private sphere and the right to prevent public disclosure of private information may not be tradeable and therefore may not attract gainbased relief under Tettenborn's theory.
G Weinrib
In Weinrib's view, the proper framework for understanding private law is the idea of corrective justice: 'The two parties are correlatively situated as the doer and sufferer of an injustice that is itself undone by the corresponding remedy.' 91 Weinrib uses this idea to explain why gain-based damages are not available for every wrong. The mere fact that the gain results from a wrong is insufficient to justify gain-based damages, in the same way in which factual causation alone is insufficient to justify compensatory damages. What matters is not the historical connection of gain to wrong, but whether the gain partakes of the wrong's normative quality. Gain-based damages are justified where the defendant's gain is of something that lies within the right of the plaintiff, for then the gain stands as the present embodiment of the wrong rather than just a sequel to it. A prime example is the misappropriation of a proprietary right, which Weinrib defines as a right that can be asserted against the whole world and is morally capable of being acquired and alienated. 92 In addition, the relationship between the parties can give rise to an interest that is sufficiently property-like to allow gain-based damages. There are two categories: one is a pre-existing (in particular, fiduciary) relationship between the parties, which is irrelevant in the present context; the other is an 'action of the defendant that implicitly or explicitly treats the plaintiff's right as an asset whose value the defendant can appropriate'. 93 Where D is hired to beat up P and does so, says Weinrib, D treats P's bodily 
H Worthington
Worthington recognises two different types of gain-based relief in the context of wrongs, with different fields of application. 95 One is the disgorgement of all ill-gotten profits, which is only available where an equitable obligation of good faith or loyalty has been broken. This category, which Worthington places outside the law of unjust enrichment, is irrelevant in the present context. The other type of restitution for wrongs is the claim for the 'use value' of misappropriated property, which Worthington regards as a claim in autonomous or subtractive unjust enrichment. The unauthorised use of property, says Worthington, entitles the owner to claim the 'use value' of the property but not disgorgement of all profits made from the use. She applies this concept to land, chattels, money and intangible property, and predicts the future recognition of 'information rights' as some kind of property, which development 'would liberate the protection of information from the confines of breach of confidence requirements (where it is the relationship of confidence, not the information per se, which is all important)'. 96 It follows that once private information is recognised as some kind of property, Worthington's theory will support a claim for the 'use value' of the information in cases of invasion of privacy.
I The significance of exclusive entitlements
The existing theories on the proper scope of 'restitution for wrongs' come to very different conclusions in the context of privacy. Some theories support gain-based relief for all invasions of privacy; some theories deny gain-based relief for all invasions of privacy; and some theories support gain-based relief for certain invasions of privacy and deny it for others. This disparity in the context of privacy flows from the disparity of the theories in general. While no theme is common to all of them, a theme that is common to most is the availability of gain-based relief for the misappropriation of 'property', at least in its actual sense. That is convincing. The crucial feature of ownership in tangible or intangible property is the owner's exclusive right to decide whether, when and how to use the asset. Any use of the asset should be for the owner's benefit unless the owner or the law has decided otherwise. Where another person has used the asset without the owner's consent and without any other legal justification, the owner can claim that use or, since the use cannot be given up in kind, the monetary value of the use to the usurper. Gain-based relief is the natural consequence of recognising an exclusive entitlement to the asset.
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Once this principle is recognised, it must logically apply beyond tangible and intangible property to all exclusive entitlements. It should be irrelevant whether the exclusive entitlement is alienable or whether the plaintiff intended to exploit it commercially because the defendant, by using the plaintiff's exclusive entitlement without authorisation, has in fact treated the entitlement as a commodity.
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The right to privacy, insofar as it is recognised, constitutes an exclusive entitlement, the unauthorised use of which ought to trigger gain-based relief. This shall be explained by reference to the unauthorised public disclosure of private information but applies equally to other forms of invasion of privacy. Where the disclosure of certain private information can be prevented through an injunction, the holder of the information has an exclusive right to decide whether, when and how to use the information. Whether the information can properly be described as 'property' is not relevant here. 99 It might be argued that the right to keep private information private is not an exclusive entitlement since it can be overridden by a public interest in disclosure. But such an argument would be misconceived. Exclusive entitlements are rarely absolute. In certain circumstances-necessity, for example-even the owner of tangible property must endure the use of the asset by others without the owner's consent. But the owner's entitlement is exclusive in general, that is, in the absence of countervailing factors that exceptionally override the owner's right. Likewise, the right to keep private information private is exclusive in general, that is, in the absence of countervailing factors (in particular a public interest in disclosure) that exceptionally override the information holder's right. Since gain-based relief is the natural consequence of recognising an exclusive entitlement to an asset (in a wide sense), the unauthorised use of an exclusive entitlement should in principle be a sufficient basis for awarding gain-based relief. There is no reason why gain-based relief should additionally require that the use of the exclusive entitlement is a wrong in the sense that it attracts compensatory relief (if loss has been suffered). There is no reason why factors excluding compensatory relief, such as immunity or innocence, should necessarily exclude gain-based relief too. Conversely, there may be good reasons for excluding gain-based relief where compensatory relief is available. Compensatory and gain-based remedies ought to be capable of having different requirements as to culpability etc, depending upon specific policy considerations for the remedy in question. Under the intellectual property law of England and Wales, for example, certain remedies for certain intellectual property wrongs require culpability while others do not.
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Gain-based relief for the unauthorised use of an exclusive entitlement should thus be classified as an instance of autonomous unjust enrichment rather than dependent (parasitic) unjust enrichment or restitution for wrongs. But this issue may have little relevance to the public disclosure of private information, at least with regard to the requirement of culpability. Considering the high significance of freedom of speech, culpability should be required for both compensatory and gain-based relief in those cases. There should be no liability where the defendant was not, and could not reasonably have been, aware that the information in question was protected private information. Furthermore, ignorance of the private nature of information may rarely occur in practice.
Since the concept of exclusive entitlements provides a sufficient basis of gain-based relief for (culpable) invasion of privacy, it is not necessary to discuss whether the unauthorised use of exclusive entitlements is the only basis of 'restitution for wrongs'. In particular, it is not necessary to discuss whether gain-based relief ought to be available for all wrongs or at least all wrongs committed with a view to make profit.
IV CONCLUSION
At least some forms of invasion of privacy are actionable as such in most common law jurisdictions, and in some of those jurisdictions, the plaintiff cannot only claim compensation for loss suffered but can alternatively claim the profit the defendant has made from invading the plaintiff's privacy. In Australia, where the existence of a common law wrong of invasion of privacy is uncertain and statutory protection of privacy is limited, the creation of a full-blown statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy has been recommended by three law reform bodies, two of which have recommended the availability of an account of profits as one possible remedy.
Insofar as a right to privacy is recognised, gain-based relief should in principle be available for its invasion. The right to privacy constitutes a right to exclude others from one's private sphere and thus an exclusive entitlement against the whole world. It is an inherent feature of an exclusive entitlement that any use of it ought to be for the benefit of the right-holder unless the law or the right-holder says otherwise. Gain-based relief is the natural consequence of the unauthorised use of an exclusive entitlement. It should be irrelevant whether the exclusive entitlement is alienable or whether the plaintiff intended to exploit it commercially, since the defendant's unauthorised use of the plaintiff's entitlement has in fact commercialised it.
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The law is outlined in Sirko Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations: The Search for Harmonised Principles (Hart, Oxford, 2010) 196-7. 
